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RESUMEN: Ofrezco respuestas a lo que considero son los aspectos más destacados de las críticas de John Biro, James Freeman, David 
Hitchcock, Robert Pinto, Harvey Siegel y Luis Vega al modelo normativo para la argumentación que he desarrollado en Gi-
ving Reasons. Cada respuesta se articula en torno a una cuestión principal, i.e., la distinción entre normatividad constitutiva y 
regulativa dentro de los modelos de la Teoría de la Argumentación, la evaluación semántica de la argumentación, el concepto de 
justificación, las diferencias entre el modelo de Toulmin y mi modelo de argumento y el análisis de la dimension pragmática de 
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First of all, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to all the contributors to this vo-
lume for their insightful observations. I hope that these responses, which have had to 
be less detailed and complete than what I would have liked, are worth of them. 
 Due to strict space constraints, I have focused on what I take to be the most sa-
lient aspects of their criticisms. Thus, my response to each author’s contribution is ar-
ticulated on a main question; but I have had to leave unanswered other interesting 
points that they also raise. Hopefully, we will have occasion to discuss further in the 
future…! 
1. Constitutive and regulative normativity 
The normative model proposed in Giving Reasons is mainly grounded on a speech-act 
analysis of argumentation. One of the main problems that Biro and Siegel find in this 
proposal is that such approach “can tell us only whether someone is arguing, not 
whether she is arguing well, by whatever criterion” (p. 281). 
 In section 2.5.5 of Giving Reasons, I argue that normative models for argumentation 
must deploy two types of normative proposals. On the one hand, they must be able to 
distinguish argumentation from other type of phenomena, so as to ground the differ-
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ence between real and false argumentation.1 This type of normative proposal would be 
constitutive of the concept argumentation. On the other hand, normative models must be 
able to tell the difference between good argumentation and bad argumentation. This 
type of normative proposal would be regulative. Biro and Siegel take that a speech-act 
analysis of argumentation can be, at it best, just constitutively normative, but not regu-
latively normative. 
 Actually, they also have doubts on my proposal regarding the former type of nor-
mativity. In their view, “there is no single thing, argumentation, that can have the dif-
ferent sorts of property the various approaches Bermejo-Luque distinguishes focus 
on. In fact, as she herself allows, these different approaches take their objects of study 
to be different” (p. 280). 
 Certainly, it is commonly acknowledged that logical (and some epistemic) models 
focus on arguments, dialectical models focus on argumentative procedures and rhetor-
ical models focus on argumentative processes. But this view somehow contradicts the 
actual practice within the field: in fact, current proposals take themselves to be rivals. 
How can it be? Because, despite they adopt different theoretical objects – i.e., their cor-
responding characterizations of argumentation as a product, a procedure or a process 
– they aim to deal with the same phenomenon – i.e. argumentation, whatever it is. Each 
theory takes its theoretical object to be the best way to deal with the real phenomenon 
of argumentation; and this is why, for example, despite they certainly adopt different 
theoretical objects, Biro and Siegel criticize Pragma-dialectics (or I myself criticize Biro 
and Siegel’s proposal).2 
 The main goal of Giving Reasons is to defend a conception of argumentation as a 
certain type of speech-act. As I try to show throughout the book, this theoretical ob-
ject has many advantages over other models’ theoretical objects: not only at a purely 
theoretical level (for, as I argue in section 2.5, it is a suitable starting point in order to 
avoid instrumentalism and, with it, the justification problem), but also respecting our 
common goal of dealing with argumentation as a phenomenon (for it enables, among 
other things, an integrated account of argumentation’s justificatory and persuasive 
powers and is fruitful enough to deal with related phenomena such as the relationship 
between reasoning and arguing, with non-verbal, indirect and non-literal argumenta-
tion, etc.). The extent to which I succeed in showing this will be a measure of the sui-
tability of my approach compared to others. (It would be great if, because of its suita-
bility to ground a normative model, people start thinking of argumentation in terms of 
the second-order speech-act complex of arguing!) 
 Biro and Siegel’s second line of criticism has to do with the regulatively normative 
part of my proposal. They contend that my object of study, i.e. acts of arguing, cannot 
                                                     
1 In Giving Reasons, I argue that certain types of fallacies, like the ad baculum, pivot on the trick of pretend-
ing to be arguing when in fact one is doing something instead (like, for example, menacing the ad-
dressee). 
2 In section 2.4.2 of Giving Reasons, I analyze in more detail the distinction between the theoretical object 
of a normative model for argumentation and the target phenomenon this model is meant to deal 
with.  
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be good or bad in the non-instrumentalist sense that, we agree, must ground a proper 
account of argumentative value. In their view, “if ‘argumentation’ really means ‘ar-
guing’, the objects with which the theory deals (acts) do not have logical properties, 
and if it means ‘arguments’ (structured sets of propositions purporting to provide 
support for beliefs), a theory of how to tell when those do what they purport to do 
has no room for dialectical or rhetorical considerations.” (p. 281) 
 Certainly, most acts do not have such properties, but speech-acts do have semantic 
and syntactic properties: for example, assertions, claims and other types of constatives 
can be true or false and can be syntactically right or flawed. On my account, the se-
mantic and syntactic properties of acts of arguing determine their logical value, i.e., 
whether their target-claims are correct or not. (I will come back to this account of the 
logical value of acts of arguing when discussing Freeman’s and Pinto’s criticisms). But 
just as assertions are not good qua assertions just by being semantically and syntactically 
good (they have to be pragmatically good as well), acts of arguing are not good qua ar-
gumentation just by being logically good. 
 On my account the logical value of an act of arguing is crucial. But it is not enough 
to determine its argumentative value, i.e. whether the act of arguing succeeds in showing 
its target-claim to be correct, which is, in turn, my proposed definition of “justifica-
tion”.3 Actually, provided that Biro and Siegel agree that justification is the sort of value 
our normative models should aim at characterize, I would say that logic is not enough 
for them either. For, in their view, “to ask whether that object is a good one of its 
kind is, in the case of arguments, to ask whether it can be used to lead to justified belief” 
(p. 282, my italics). 
 In order to preserve a certain metaphysical parsimony, I prefer to think of argu-
ments as representations of the semantic and syntactic properties of particular acts of 
arguing. That is, contrary to Biro and Siegel, who claim that “an act of arguing is the 
deployment of an abstract object with semantic and syntactic properties” (p. nn), I 
think that arguments are posits, mere reconstructions. But I am willing to accept that a 
good argument is an argument that can be used to justify. The question is then: can a 
good argument be used badly? And, in this case, would it lead to justified belief? 
 Biro and Siegel do not take pragmatic conditions to determine argument goodness. 
Fair enough. But they are bound to admit pragmatic conditions for justification if they 
do not want to refuse the idea that good arguments can be used “badly” (for example, 
by using them in order to support a claim which is not the target-claim – which is 
what we do when we commit, for example, a straw man fallacy). 
 It might seem that Biro, Siegel and I are not so far away from each other: the sort 
of activity I name “argumentation” might be regarded by them as the sort of activity 
one is engaged in when “using” an argument for justifying a claim. However, unlike 
them, I contend that it is crucial not to forget that this is a communicative activity, 
that is, an activity pragmatically constrained by its very nature as a certain type of 
communication. On my account, the pragmatic constraints of argumentation corres-
                                                     
3 On my account, good argumentation is argumentation providing justification to its target-claim, in the 
sense of showing it to be correct. 
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pond to the dialectical and rhetorical conditions of arguing. This is why Biro and Sie-
gel question “the viability and, indeed, desirability” of integrating argumentation’s log-
ical, dialectical and rhetorical dimensions: in their view, pragmatic constraints do not 
determine justification. But this position, I have tried to show, is untenable for anyone 
acknowledging that arguments are used for justifying. 
 Biro and Siegel try to avoid the need of appealing to the idea of “using arguments 
with the purpose of justifying” by providing the following definition of argumenthood 
and argument goodness: “what makes a set of propositions an argument for p is its suita-
bility to be deployed – whether or not it actually is – to justify someone in believing 
that p, and what makes such an argument a good one is that it does in fact provide 
good reasons for believing that p – whether its target (or, indeed, anyone) actually 
comes to believe that p on its basis” (p. 283). But I find this account even more prob-
lematic. First: what does it mean to say that a set of propositions “can be deployed to 
justify someone in believing that p”? If, in normal circumstances, someone tells you 
“my name is Jean”, she is certainly deploying a proposition in a way that will certainly 
justify you in believing that her name is Jean. Yet, “my name is Jean” is not an argu-
ment. Second: what does it mean to say that an argument “provides good reason for be-
lieving something”? If, in certain circumstances, someone offers you a very bad argu-
ment, he will be giving you good reason for believing that he is not too smart. Yet, his 
bad argument is not a good argument for this belief. 
 In order to avoid these counterexamples, Biro and Siegel need to say, rather, that 
the content of the belief to be believed because of the goodness of the argument cor-
responds to the content of the conclusion of this argument. That is, they have to say 
that the argument is not a good reason for this belief, but rather contains a good reason 
for it. And how can an argument “contain” a good reason? That is, what is a good rea-
son in this sense? On my account, it is just a claim showing that the target-claim for 
which that claim constitutes a reason indeed is correct. But Biro and Siegel do not 
think of reasons as speech-acts. This is why, in my view, their constitutively and regu-
latively normative proposals cannot really work as a model for argumentation. 
2. The semantic value of argumentation 
As pointed out above, James Freeman’s detailed analysis focuses on my proposal for 
determining the logical value of acts of arguing. He has serious misgivings regarding 
my accounts of qualifiers, inference-claims and validity, and my contention that logical 
normativity is not a matter of form, but a matter of the pragmatic conditions in which 
inferences supervene. 
 In Giving Reasons, I follow Toulmin’s intuition that qualifiers are the key to deter-
mine logical value. But my adoption of a speech-act model makes my strategy a little 
different from Toulmin’s. I characterize argumentation as a second-order speech-act 
complex, that is, a speech-act composed of the second-order speech-acts of adducing 
(i.e., the reason) and concluding (i.e., the target-claim). These speech-acts are related to 
each other because of their relationship to another speech-act, namely, the implicit in-
ference-claim that is also constitutive of any act of arguing. By means of this infe-
rence-claim, a couple of first-order constatives R and C (whether directly or indirectly, 
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literally or non-literally performed) become the second-order speech-acts of adducing 
and concluding. Normally, the fact that the speaker has used a qualifier like “proba-
bly,” “necessarily,” “evidently,” etc., or a expression like “so,” “therefore,” “since,” 
“consequently,” etc., authorizes us to make this linguistic presumption, which 
amounts to interpret the speaker’s performance as an act of arguing indeed. 
 This distinction between the constatives that any act of arguing would consist of 
and the act of arguing proper grounds my distinction between ontological and epistemic 
qualifiers. Without aiming to get into deep philosophical issues, I contended that, in 
saying that a certain representation of the world is true, necessary, possible, impossi-
ble, plausible, acceptable, probable, presumable, etc. we are saying something about its 
representativeness respecting the world. All these expressions would then be ontological 
qualifiers, making explicit the type and degree of pragmatic force with which we put 
forward the corresponding contents in our constatives. On the other hand, in saying 
that a claim holds truly, necessarily, possibly, plausibly, probably, presumably, etc. (or 
alternatively, that it is likely that p, that it might be the case that p, that certainly p, etc.), 
we are saying something about the status of this claim as knowledge, about the confi-
dence we should bank on this claim or our entitlement to it. That would be the role of 
epistemic qualifiers, which express the type and degree of pragmatic force of our acts of 
arguing.4 
 On this account, Freeman’s observation that “on many occasions, we put forward 
a conclusion as simply being true” (p. 291) would be misguided: acts of concluding in-
volve two kinds of pragmatic force, namely, that of the ontological qualifier of the 
corresponding claim as such claim and that of the epistemic qualifier of this claim as 
the target-claim of the act of arguing. Besides, he would be wrong in saying that I do 
not conveniently distinguish between “the necessity of the consequence and the ne-
cessity of the consequent” (p. 293): on my account, when we use deductive acts of ar-
guing for supporting contingent truths, such as the far-famed ones reporting the mor-
tality of Socrates, what we do is to put forward that necessarily (epistemic qualifier) it is 
true (ontological qualifier) that Socrates is mortal. Actually, as I explain in section 7.2.3, 
we can also have other combinations of epistemic and ontological qualifiers in the tar-
get-claim. For example, because of the reasons that we can adduce for them, certain 
ontologically necessary truths may have to be epistemically qualified just by a “likely.” 
This is the case, for example, when mathematicians check (instead of demonstrate) recal-
citrant hypotheses such as Fermat’s last theorem or Goldbach’s conjecture by consi-
dering a large amount of numbers. As acts of arguing for the corresponding hypothes-
es, these strategies are inductive because their inference-claims are not necessary ma-
thematical truths, but (more or less) plausible claims in the lines of “if a mathematical 
                                                     
4 As I point out in section 7.3.2 of Giving Reasons, there are epistemic qualifiers without a straightforward 
ontological counterpart, such as “likely”, “no doubt”, “in all probability”, as well as certain uses of 
“could,” “must,” “should,” “may,” “might,” etc. I take the correspondence between epistemic and 
ontological qualifiers to be idiomatic, something to be empirically determined for each language. 
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hypothesis holds for an enormous amount of numbers, then it is correct”.5 Yet, if 
Fermat’s last theorem or Goldbach’s conjecture is true, it is a mathematical necessity. 
 Now, this is how I assume Toulmin’s distinction between deduction and induction: 
on my account, this distinction is a matter of the ontological qualifier that we should 
use to qualify the inference-claim of the corresponding act of arguing. That is, acts of 
arguing whose inference-claims are necessary truths (ontological qualifier) entitle us to 
draw our conclusions with a “necessarily” (epistemic qualifier): they are deductive. In 
turn, acts of arguing whose inference-claims are just probable, plausible, acceptable, 
etc. (ontological qualifiers), entitle us to draw our conclusions only with a “probably”, 
a “plausibly”, a “likely”, etc. (epistemic qualifiers): they are non-deductive.6 
 Thus, I characterize the validity of an act of arguing as a matter of this act having 
an inference-claim whose ontological qualifier, as presented by the speaker in her ac-
tual act of arguing, is correct indeed. In being correct, such inference-claim sanctions 
the epistemic qualifier implicitly or explicitly used for concluding the target-claim. Con-
sequently, non-deductive arguments may also be valid in this sense. In turn, an act of 
arguing will be formally valid if its inference-claim is true because of its form. Thus, for 
example, acts of arguing like “it’s raining; streets will be wet” are not formally valid, 
but the traditional reinterpretation of such argumentations as enthymematic, i.e., as 
having implicit premises that turn them into instances of modus ponens, is formally valid 
indeed: “it’s raining and if it rains streets will be wet; therefore, streets will be wet” has 
as its inference-claim a conditional which is true because of its form. 
 So, I do not “characterize validity as having a valid logical form” (p.290) and I do 
not “confuse syntax and semantics” (p. 290). Rather, my thesis in Chapter IV that log-
ical normativity is pragmatic, not a matter of form, relies on the observation that “be-
ing true because of its form” is something that depends on the formalization and the 
formal system on which we judge that the inference-claim is true. 
 As I see it, all this account of logical value and of the nature of logical normativity 
is Toulminian, at least in spirit. There is one thing, however, about which Freeman 
rightly observes that I do not quite follow Toulmin. This is my conception of war-
rants. I will  come back to this question in dealing with Robert Pinto’s criticisms, but I 
would like to make a couple of remarks here. 
 As pointed out above, on my account, arguments are just representations of acts of 
arguing. This is something both Freeman and Pinto seem to forget at times. My theo-
retical object is acts of arguing, and the elements I deal with come from my characte-
rization of acts of arguing as second-order speech-act complexes. Most of these ele-
                                                     
5 For a long time mathematicians could not provide a deductive proof for Fermat’s last theorem, but they 
thought that it was likely true because it held for the very many numbers that had been examined up 
to that time. And, so far, we only have this kind of non-deductive arguments for Goldbach’s conjec-
ture. 
6 Actually, I do not make a sharp contrast between deductive and inductive inferences, in the sense of in-
ferences whose conclusions follow of necessity and those whose conclusions are less than certain. 
For example, acts of arguing having pragmatic presumptions as inference-claims will qualify their 
conclusions with a “presumably”, which is a kind of qualification that does not seem to fit well in any 
of these two groups. 
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ments have their counterpart in Toulmin’s model of argument, but not all: for exam-
ple, Toulmin does not distinguish between epistemic and ontological qualifiers. 
 In principle, in representing the logical properties of acts of arguing, I take war-
rants to stand for inference-claims. There is a lot of controversy on Toulmin’s concep-
tion of warrants, but most argumentation theorists understand that they are meant to 
be general, rule-like statements sanctioning the step from reason to conclusion. Con-
trastingly, I take that the propositional content of the inference-claim is, simply, that 
of the material, truth-functional conditional. To this, Freeman, in the same vein as 
Pinto, objects: “truth-conditions would not seem sufficient to express the expected 
connection between the propositional contents of the reason and the inference-target, 
or the corresponding premise and conclusion. To adduce a reason for a target-claim 
one asserts not just that if the reason is true, so is the target claim, but that the target-
claim follows in some sense from the reason.” (p. 290) 
 Yet, following Grice’s account of conditionals, I take inference-claims of the form 
"if 79974 is divisible by 3, then 79974 is divisible by 9" to be conversationally inap-
propriate, but not false. In other words, I think that an act of arguing such as "79974 
is divisible by 3, therefore 79974 is divisible by 9" is semantically correct, but pragmat-
ically flawed because the reason is irrelevant. To my mind, this kind of irrelevance is 
pragmatic: we put forward a reason in order to show a target claim to be correct, but 
the reason does not work for this end. On Grice’s account, the only circumstances in 
which it is appropriate to assert a conditional is where the speaker is ignorant of the 
truth-values of R and C, but believes that if R happens to be true, C will as well. 
 Thus, in section 3.3.3 of Giving Reasons, I explain that I take the truth-value of infe-
rence-claims to be that of the corresponding material conditional, whereas I admit that 
their assertibility conditions involve, no doubt, certain relationships of relevance be-
tween R and C. These relationships can be causal, conceptual, logical, etc., and if they 
do not hold, we will criticize the act of arguing for being pragmatically flawed. 
 However, let me insist that, in my account, inference-claims can have other values 
than truth-values: they can be probable (to a degree x), plausible (to a degree y), neces-
sary, possible, presumable, etc. Freeman correctly points out that, in dealing with infe-
rence-claims whose ontological qualifier is a probability value, we should not deal with 
them as truth-conditional claims. And, of course, I agree. Actually, as I say in section 
7.2.3 of Giving Reasons, in these cases, conditional probability will work better as an es-
timate of the ontological qualifier of such inference-claims. In turn, in order to deter-
mine whether a certain inference-claim is presumable, we will have to consider wheth-
er accepting the conditional makes sense in the circumstances; and in order to deter-
mine whether it is necessary or not, we will have to consider, for example, whether it 
holds in every possible world, if possible worlds semantics is your preferred account 
of necessity.7 
                                                     
7 I do not mean that I have a theory of the semantics of any type of conditional. Certainly, my contention 
is that determining the value of an act of arguing involves determining the ontological qualifiers of its 
reason and inference-claim. But I do not think that a normative model for argumentation is a theory 
of such a thing. Actually, one might be a skeptic about necessity, for example, and yet admit that valid 
deductive arguments are those having necessary inference-claims, that is, none. 
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3. A conception of justification 
David Hitchcok’s main discrepancy with my account is related to my conception of 
justification. He agrees that justification is the sort of value our normative models for 
argumentation should characterize, but is unhappy with my particular proposal. He 
has three, closely related, qualms. First, he takes that acts of arguing are attempts at 
justifying that the action or emotion expressed in its conclusion is correct – and not 
attempts at justifying target-claims, which is what I defend. Second, he doubts that we 
can always reconstruct reasons and conclusions as (qualified) constatives. And third, 
he finds my reconstruction of justification as “showing correctness” wanting. 
 There is a first, straightforward answer to the overall criticism of my conception of 
justification: as I explain in Chapter II of Giving Reasons, my use of the term “justifica-
tion” is technical; it is meant to be just a name for the sort of value a normative model 
of argumentation should characterize. That is, I contended that good argumentation 
for a claim that p is the same as justification for a claim that p. As argued in that chap-
ter, this was the way I tried to overcome the justification problem that normative 
models for argumentation are bounded to face. My strategy was to think of them as 
descriptions of the pre-theoretical concept of argumentation goodness which is, in 
turn, a value that constitutes argumentation as an activity: arguing would be, constitu-
tively, aiming at justifying. It is because individuals are able to recognize this value that 
they are able to say of each other that they argue. Thus, a characterization of argumen-
tation as behavior aimed at a certain goal would in turn result in a definition of what 
counts as arguing well, namely, behaving so as to achieve this goal. 
 In the particular linguistic-pragmatic model developed in Giving Reasons, argumen-
tation is defined as a communicative activity whose constitutive goal is to show a tar-
get-claim to be correct. Particularly, I characterized argumentation as a second-order 
speech-act complex that, illocutionarily, counts as an attempt to show its target-claim 
to be correct. Consequently, I assumed that any piece of argumentation actually show-
ing its target-claim to be correct has the sort of value that a normative model for ar-
gumentation must characterize, i.e., it is argumentation achieving justification for its 
target-claim. 
 Now, this kind of speech-act is the theoretical object of my linguistic-pragmatic nor-
mative model. As argued above in responding to Biro and Siegel, this means that the 
adequacy of this model will be a measure of this object’s ability to represent the real 
phenomenon argumentation theorists are interested in. My contention is that any 
practice that can be said to be argumentation can be characterized as such second-
order speech-act complex. But this is, at least to a great extent, an empirical thesis, 
something to be tested: it might be the case that certain phenomena that, pre-
theoretically, we are willing to recognize as argumentation cannot be adequately dealt 
with using my model.8 
                                                     
8 In turn, the value of my model, as of any other, will depend on how well it manages to interpret, analyze 
and evaluate real argumentation. To a great extent, then, such a value is a matter of the practical ade-
quacy of this model. 
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 But this “straightforward” response to Hitchcock’s concern with my conception of 
justification is only part of a full answer: after all, I might have chosen any other term 
to designate argumentative value…! Indeed, I have the overall intuition that the centrality 
of Argumentation Theory within Philosophy derives from the fact that concepts such 
as justification, reasons and even rationality are, primarily, argumentative concepts. Of 
course, this is such a general and ambitious thesis that I will not even dare to argue for 
it here. Giving Reasons is just a first step in this direction. But part of its achievements 
regarding this general project depends on the plausibility of the idea that reasons, and 
the type of things something may be a reason for, are second-order constatives. This 
means that we argue for claims, not for the action or the emotion expressed in the 
conclusion of our arguments, which is Hitchcock’s view. 
 As pointed out above, in Giving Reasons I provide an analysis of argumentation as a 
second-order speech-act complex, that is, a speech-act composed of a speech-act of 
adducing and a speech-act of concluding. On this account, acts of adducing and acts 
of concluding are constatives; but they are second-order constatives, because they can 
only be performed by means of first-order speech-acts. Paradigmatically, such first-
order speech-acts are also constatives, but there are other possibilities. I provided an 
extension of Bach & Harnish’s Speech Act Schema (SAS) in order to interpret and 
analyze particular acts of arguing, including what I take to be cases of indirect or non-
literal argumentation. 
 For example, in “I promise I’ll take care, don’t worry”, two first-order speech-acts 
(a promise and a request) would turn into the constative speech-act of adducing that 
the arguer commits herself to take care and the constative speech-act of concluding 
that the addressee should not worry. In general, the idea behind this model is that 
when we argue, two constatives (whether directly or indirectly performed, literal or 
non-literal) become an act of adducing, R, and an act of concluding, C. This happens 
because of their relationship with an implicit inference-claim whose propositional con-
tent is “if R, then C.” In a few words, it is because we can attribute to the speaker the 
implicit inference-claim “if I commit myself to take care, then you should not worry” 
that we can interpret her utterances of “I promise I’ll take care” and “don’t worry” as 
a single argumentative speech-act. This inference-claim is, precisely, the reason why 
acts of adducing and acts of concluding have to be constatives: the inference-claim es-
tablishes an inferential relationship between their contents by stating that if something 
is the case then something other is also the case. 
 Now, imagine that, as Hitchcock says, someone argues for a directive such as “take 
them all”. On which ground could we say that a given reason for it is a good reason? 
Something like “I don’t need any of them” would be a good reason for “you may take 
them all” whereas “I need the shelf for myself” would rather be good for “you must 
take them all”. As conclusions, directives are too unspecific. 
 As I argue in several passages of Giving Reasons, the sort of persuasion that argu-
mentative communication enables is legitimate, by contrast to other type of symbolic 
inducements, in the sense that it is meant to be the result of making others see (what-
ever that means) that something is correct. But the correctness of an action or an 
emotion, which are the sort of things Hitchcock takes to be the only suitable objects 
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to argue for (p. 303) is, in itself, something too ambiguous: is this correctness a matter 
of moral correctness, of practical adequacy, of desirability (as opposed to mere desire), of per-
missibility, of practical possibility or necessity, of accountability, etc…? In order to evaluate a 
piece of argumentation, it is crucial to get ride of such ambiguity. For this reason, even 
though I agree with Hitchcock that argumentation enables beliefs, actions, and even 
emotions, to be coordinated with others by rational means, I take that this coordina-
tion is always brought about via beliefs. In other words, argumentation provides theo-
retical justification for what we argue for. This may explain one of the main features 
of argumentative persuasion: namely, that this sort of persuasion cannot be forced by 
making salient motives that would make it pragmatically right accepting a given direc-
tive, comissive, expressive, etc. – like when we are threatened or bribed, for example. 
As I see it, argumentation can promote agreement on practical matters because it 
promotes agreement about what is the case and this includes what we “should,” 
“need,” “shouldn’t,” “must,” “cannot,” “may,” “might,” etc. “do”, “desire”, “believe”, 
“decide”, “fear”, “expect”, etc. 
 Accordingly, in my view, those pieces of argumentation containing speech-acts 
other than constatives should be interpreted as indirect argumentation. In turn, in “A 
unitary schema for arguments by analogy” (Bermejo-Luque, forthcoming) I have ar-
gued that, even though analogies, like metaphors, do not count as proper assertions –
which is the reason why they happen to be such powerful rhetorical devices– addres-
sees of analogical and metaphorical argumentation are bounded to make sense of ana-
logical and metaphorical reasons as full-fledged constatives, on pain of being defense-
less in the face of their literal falsity (metaphors) or of their trivial truth (analogies). 
Analogical and metaphorical argumentation would be, on a SAS basis account, non-
literal argumentation. 
4. More on inference-claims and warrants 
I have provided part of my responses to Robert Pinto’s qualms in responding to 
Freeman’s. I hope the following remarks will complete my answer to what I take to be 
a common misunderstanding. As I see it, this misunderstanding is based on a failure 
to notice that my conception of warrants is the result of (1) my conception of argu-
mentation as a speech-act – not the other way round – and (2) the corresponding view 
of arguments – and of the elements an argument consists of – just as mere representa-
tions of acts of arguing – and of the elements acts of arguing consists of. I think this 
failure is based on an inherent ambiguity in Toulmin’s approach.9 
 Pinto finds my account of inference-claims wanting, as compared with Toulmin’s 
account of warrants. Following Toulmin, he considers, with Freeman, that, contrary to 
inference-claims, “warrants must be general statements” and, in addition, he underlines 
that “when stated explicitly [warrants] are practical statements about what we may 
“safely” do or what we are entitled to do” (p. 314). 
                                                     
9 Unfortunately, I cannot get into this question here. I have dealt with it in sections 4.3.4 and 4.4.6 of Giv-
ing Reasons. 
Exchanging Reasons: responses to critics 
Theoria 72 (2011): 329-343 
339
 Let me explain, first, why Pinto misrepresents my position when he says that, in 
my view, “nothing further is required to link reason and conclusion or to “justify” the 
step from reason to conclusion” (p. 314, my italics).  
 Certainly, in my account, inference-claims stand for nothing but the inferential link 
of the act of arguing. Yet, I have no problem with admitting that this link itself may be 
in need of justification: inference-claims are claims after all. What I do actually reject is 
the idea that the way inference-claims bridge the gap between reason and target-claim 
is by justifying the step from reason to target-claim. Inference-claims just make explicit 
this step: they express the inferential relationship the speaker establishes between rea-
son and target-claim, just by arguing. In turn, I take warrants to be mere representa-
tions of inference-claims in arguments. Consequently, contrary to what Pinto suggests 
in footnote 8, I have no doubt that warrants can be made explicit: indeed, this is what 
we do when we represent an act of arguing by using this model of argument!10 My 
contention is, instead, that inference-claims are necessarily implicit in acts of arguing be-
cause they are the linguistic presumptions we make in order to interpret the speaker’s 
utterance of “she is red haired” as a reason for the claim that “she is hot-tempered”. It 
is because we interpret the speaker as establishing an inferential relationship between 
these two claims that we interpret her words as a unitary communicative contribution, 
that is, a full-fledged act of arguing. 
 But Pinto considers that warrants must be something else. Particularly, he takes 
them to be (general) rules that entitle us to make the corresponding inferences. He says: 
to see why there is a question about the nature of that step, we need only reflect on the example 
from Scriven (…). Where the “step” in the argument is from a reason expressed by ‘she has red 
hair’ to a conclusion expressed by ‘she is hot-tempered’, it is not immediately clear which features 
of the reason are supposed to link it to the conclusion – that is to say, the bearing which the rea-
son is supposed by the arguer to have on that conclusion is not immediately clear. Is the premise 
supposed to support the conclusion because it says of a person that that person has red hair? Or is 
it supposed to support the conclusion because it says of a woman that she has red hair? The nature 
of the step, and the bearing of the reason on the conclusion, is not clarified by pointing to an “in-
ference-claim” which merely embeds reason and conclusion in a material conditional. (p.316) 
 I absolutely agree that the inference-claim is not enough to fully determine the in-
terpretation of the reason and, also, that a full interpretation of the reason is crucial in 
order to appraise the argument. But I do not think that this view is incompatible with 
my proposal. Let me explain this by considering a similar criticism by Freeman. Free-
man says: 
[T]o answer Toulmin’s warrant-generating question – How do you get there? – one must indicate 
some general connection between data and claim. Although Toulmin allows “If D, then C” to 
frame the warrant, he indicates that a more candid way of formulating it is to say “Data such as D 
entitle one to draw conclusions, or make claims such as C” (1958, 98; italics added). Although 
                                                     
10 All through the book, I have insisted on the idea that arguments are representations of acts of arguing, 
and I have tried to make clear the distinction between the elements of the act of arguing and the ele-
ments of the argument. Thus, for example, I have used the terms “premise”, “conclusion” and “war-
rant” in order to avoid misunderstanding with the corresponding elements of the act of arguing “rea-
son”, “target-claim” and “inference-claim” (see section 4.4.7, where I provide a diagram of my pro-
posed model of argument). 
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egregiously vague, the “such as” indicates generality here. Should someone ask why D is a reason 
for C, to answer “If D, then C” would provide no explanation. (p. 295) 
 I think that the conditional (i.e., the implicit inference-claim) just makes explicit 
what we do when we adduce D as a reason for C. Therefore, of course, saying “if D, 
then C” does not answer why D is a reason for C. When we ask such a question, we 
are rather asking why the speaker’s implicit inference-claim is correct: after all, it is be-
cause we attribute such a claim to the speaker that we take her act of putting forward a 
claim D as a reason for her claim C. That is, in asking why D is a reason for C, we are 
demanding from the speaker a reason for her implicit inference-claim. This reason for 
the inference-claim is what I name the backing of the act of arguing. 
 And, as pointed out above in explaining my truth-functional account of inference-
claims, a backing showing an inference-claim to be true “by showing that its conse-
quent is true, without appealing to any aspect of the content of the antecedent” (p. 
317) will render the argument semantically valid, but pragmatically flawed. 
5. The pragmatic conditions of argumentation 
In a way, Luis Vega’s misgivings about my overall proposal are opposite to Biro and 
Siegel’s: while the latter complain that I am unnecessarily, and even undesirably, 
committed with the pragmatic intricacies of argumentation, Vega demands a stronger 
role for the dialectical and rhetorical dimensions of arguing. As he sees it: 
[T]he theoretical apparatus that G.R. [Giving Reasons] seems to need in order to bring about its 
proposal is not only precise but also restricted: in principle, it seems enough to have a linguisti-
cally competent speaker, a world of beliefs and of argumentative or discursive intentions and a 
rather monological framework, where the arguer’s interlocutors do not decisively count for the 
purposes, the success or failures of his activity. (p. 322) 
 In Vega’s view, a good account of argumentation should take interlocutors and 
contexts into account. 
 Actually, his concern with the role of interlocutors and contexts within a normative 
model for argumentation is displayed at two levels: on the one hand, interlocutors and 
contexts would be crucial for determining the interpretation of certain pieces of 
communication as argumentation. He offers two nice examples to make this point. 
On the other, interlocutors and contexts would partly determine the pragmatic evalua-
tion of argumentation. 
 Regarding the former concern, pragmatic-linguistic analyses have traditionally been 
very concerned indeed with the role of interlocutors and contexts in interpreting 
communication. And the model that Bach and Harnish proposed in their  Linguistic 
Communication and Speech-Acts (1979), which is the one I take as a basis for characteriz-
ing the speech-act complex of arguing, is no exception. This model deals with inter-
pretation as an inferential process in which “the speaker provides, by what he says, a 
basis for the hearer to infer what the speaker intends to be thereby doing” (1979, 5).  
Thus, it involves the following elements: 1) the general framework of a Linguistic Com-
munity (CL), which would sanction certain expressions as meaningful or meaningless, 
in general; 2) a set of Mutual Contextual Beliefs (MCBs), which ground, together with the 
speaker’s words, the inference the hearer makes and takes himself to be intended to 
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make; 3) a Communicative Presumption (CP), which is the mutual belief in CL that when-
ever a member S says something in L to another member H, he is doing so with some 
recognizable illocutionary intent; and , finally, 4) a Linguistic Presumption (LP), which is 
the mutual belief in the linguistic community CL that (i) the members of CL share L, 
and that (ii) whenever any member S utters any e in L to any to any other member H, 
H can identify what S is saying, given that H knows the meaning(s) of e in L and is 
aware of the appropriate background information (Bach & Harnish 1979, 7). 
 Obviously, all these elements involve hearers and contexts in a crucial way. And 
my addition of a fifth element – meant to characterize, in particular, the second-order 
speech-act complex of arguing – abounds in this purpose of making full-sense of that 
which is interactive and contextual in any kind of communication. This element is an 
Argumentative Presumption (AP), i.e., the mutual belief for H and S that S has implicitly 
made an inference-claim. 
 Unfortunately, I cannot provide here a full analysis of the examples Luis Vega 
proposes, but my contention is that any such analysis will involve hearers and contexts 
in the way he takes to be necessary for adequately analyzing what was going on in 
these argumentative interactions. 
 On the other hand, Vega also points at the need of taking into account interlocu-
tors and contexts in order to determine the dialectical and rhetorical value of argu-
mentation. Regarding my characterization of the dialectical dimension of argumenta-
tion in terms of the recursive nature of the activity of giving and asking for reasons, 
Vega says that this proposal does not seem to take into account the particulars of real 
interlocutors, their real demands and the way interlocutors influence the commitments 
assumed by arguers (p. 323). 
 In my view, this criticism misrepresents my proposal. As I explain in section 5.2 of 
Giving Reasons, in arguing we manage to communicate not just our beliefs, but also the 
reasons that are supposed to show that the corresponding claims are correct. Moreo-
ver, we can prompt reasonings that may cause such beliefs in our addressees. Thus, in 
argumentation, when the speaker offers a claim r as a reason for a claim that p, the ad-
dressee is put in a position either to believe that p because of r or to consider the value 
of r as a reason that shows the claim that p to be correct. Given the interactive nature 
of argumentation as a communicative activity, arguers are certainly committed to take 
into account their interlocutors’ demands in order to be credited as actually arguing: 
any contribution by a speaker must be relevant for the communicative exchange, and 
in the particular case of argumentation it must be able to be regarded by the addressee 
as an attempt to show a target-claim to be correct. This is so because acts of arguing 
are, illocutionarily, attempts at showing a target claim to be correct. 
 Regarding my account of the rhetorical constraints of arguing, Vega rightly ob-
serves that, if an act of arguing is an attempt at showing a target-claim to be correct, 
then this “showing” should be inextricably linked to that interlocutor to whom this act 
of arguing is addressed. After all, showing something is showing it to someone, and in 
order to do this, we have to take this person into account (p. nn). But, again, I think 
Vega misrepresents my position: my use of Grice’s Cooperative Principle (CP) is pre-
cisely meant to respond to this demand. 
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 In Giving Reasons, I argued in fact that the rhetorical dimension of argumentation 
plays a crucial role in determining its value. If good argumentation is argumentation 
showing its target-claim correct, then argument goodness depends both on the actual 
correctness of the target-claim and on the goodness of the argumentative act as a 
means for showing this. That is, for an act of arguing to be a good one, it will have to 
be a suitable instrument for producing that cognitive state in its addressee. After deal-
ing with the question of the conflation between an interpretative use of CP, (which is 
involved in the Speech Act Schema for acts of arguing, as developed in Chapter III) 
and the possibility of using CP as a regulative standard, I proposed to adopt Grice’s 
CP as a means to determine how well an act of arguing plays as an act of showing. 
 As it is well known, CP establishes general conditions for a talk exchange to be 
pragmatically adequate, in the sense of being “efficiently informative,” which is, ac-
cording to Grice, the primary purpose of any talk exchange. Consequently, the prag-
matic conditions that determine how well an act of arguing plays at making it salient to 
an addressee that a target-claim is correct would state that acts of arguing have to be 
relevant respecting that goal, they have to be adequately informative quantitatively and 
qualitatively, and clear enough to be understood. Argumentation that, respecting the 
goal of showing a target-claim to be correct, is irrelevant, quantitatively or qualitatively 
inadequate, or unclear will fail to show what it was aimed at showing, namely, that its 
target-claim is correct: it will then be pragmatically flawed, it will not succeed in justi-
fying, or, in other words, it will be bad argumentation.11 Of course, relevance, quality, 
quantity and clarity are context-dependent properties. This means that, on this ac-
count, there is no way of bypassing the particular conditions that the contexts of each 
piece of argumentation impose, including the fact that it is addressed to a particular 
individual or audience. But this context-sensibility does not react to factors such as the 
eventual stubbornness of the addressee or his inability to understand certain expres-
sions.12  
 In section 6.4.2 of Giving Reasons, I also pointed out, following Grice, that there 
might be different sorts of other maxims operative in different argumentative con-
texts. Because of this, I recommended to take into account the possibility of finding 
additional requirements for “correctly showing” within particular argumentative 
frameworks. I myself mentioned the examples of forensic debate and jurisprudence as 
contexts procedurally regulated by additional sorts of circumstantial constraints, like 
the distribution of time, the maximization of resources, the avoidance of having false 
positives (innocent people declared guilty), etc. These additional constraints would al-
                                                     
11 In Giving Reasons I offered an account of several traditional fallacies as violations of one or another of 
the maxims of CP, but in no way I mean that there is a univocal relationship between the set of tradi-
tional fallacies and the set of possible violations of the maxims. I agree with Vega that traditional fal-
lacies involve a component of trickiness that is not necessarily at stake in many cases of violations of 
maxims. 
12 For more on the tension between context-dependency and the need of avoiding particularisms, see sec-
tions 6.3.3 and 6.3.4, where I work out the distinction between something being funny, scary, sad, etc. 
and its producing fun, fear, sadness, etc. on particular individuals. 
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so play a role in determining how well a piece of argumentation accomplishes its 
pragmatic constraints as a good act of showing. 
 However, I have also been concerned with distinguishing argumentation from ar-
gumentative processes such as public debate or deliberation. My model is just a model 
for something that is only one part or aspect of these different kinds of processes: 
namely, acts of arguing. The procedural aspects that sanction particular argumentative 
exchanges (like the allocation of time for each party, turns of reply, etc., the norms of 
etiquette and good manners, the settlement of the agenda, the recognition of individu-
als as legitimate or illegitimate parties in the discussion, etc.) are, no doubt, of the ut-
most importance. However, as I see it, they are out of the scope of a normative model 
for argumentation, because they do not determine whether our reasons justify our tar-
get-claims; rather, they are key questions to determine the extent to which a given ar-
gumentative exchange may be said to be legitimate or adequate from a practical point 
of view. 
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